India’s defence agreements with the United States on logistics and secure communications do not commit New Delhi to support Washington in the ongoing conflict in West Asia. The arrangements do not automatically activate in times of crisis, nor do they require India to provide logistical backing or share surveillance data. At a time when tensions are high, India is also mindful of not appearing to side with either its civilisational partner Iran or its strategic partners, Israel and the US.
The Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), signed in 2016, provides a framework for reciprocal logistical support between the two countries. This includes refuelling, supplies and repairs, but only for specific, mutually agreed activities such as joint exercises or port visits. Each instance requires prior consent from both sides. The agreement does not grant blanket access to facilities, nor does it obligate India to support US military operations. It is structured to safeguard India’s strategic autonomy and does not amount to a military alliance.
In 2018, India and the US signed the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA). This pact enables India to procure and operate advanced encrypted communication equipment from the US on American-origin platforms in its inventory. However, COMCASA does not mandate automatic technology transfers or logistical support. It allows Indian forces to use secure data links and communication systems but does not create any obligation to share operational information.
Sources said both agreements function strictly on a case-by-case basis. They added that India has not received any request from the US seeking logistical assistance in relation to the current conflict. The existence of these agreements does not mean a US aircraft can land in India during a conflict and seek refuelling or supplies without explicit approval. The same applies to encrypted communication systems and surveillance capabilities on US-origin aircraft and helicopters operated by India. According to sources, imagery and operational data generated by these platforms are not shared.
India operates several US-made platforms, including the P-8I maritime patrol aircraft with the Navy and the C-17 and C-130 transport aircraft with the Air Force. The Navy also deploys the MH-60R submarine-hunting helicopter and has leased two MQ-9B drones. Together with the P-8I, the MQ-9B provides persistent, high-resolution maritime surveillance. Data collected by these assets remains with India and is not shared externally.
Both LEMOA and COMCASA are described by the two countries as foundational defence agreements. However, officials maintain that they do not automatically trigger operational cooperation or data-sharing, nor do they allow US forces to intervene or access Indian facilities without consent.
India’s record reflects a consistent reluctance to align itself with US military campaigns. During the first Gulf War in 1991, Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar allowed refuelling rights for American military aircraft en route from Pacific bases to the Persian Gulf, but the facility was later withdrawn. In 2003, when the US and its allies launched military operations in Iraq, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee refused to grant refuelling rights.
In 2014, the government led by Manmohan Singh agreed to pay for arms and equipment sourced from Russia to strengthen the Afghan National Army, but declined to deploy Indian troops on the ground. The subsequent government under Narendra Modi also chose not to join US military operations in Afghanistan.
